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The Case for Reparations 
Robert K. Fullinwider 
Because of its visibility, Randall Robinson's new book, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, may 
rekindle a broad public debate on repara tions. The 
issue is not new, nor is public debate about it. In 1969, 
the civil rights lead er James Forman presented the 
Black Manifesto to American churches, demanding that 
they pay blacks five hundred million dollars in repara-
tions. The Manifesto a rgued that for three and a half 
centuries blacks in America had been " exploited and 
degraded , brutalized, killed and persecuted" by 
whites. This treatment was part of a persistent institu-
tional pattern of, first, legal slavery and, later, lega l dis-
crimination and forced segregation. Through slavery 
and discrimination, the Manifesto went on to contend, 
whites have extracted enormous wealth from black 
labor with little return to blacks themselves. These 
facts constitute grounds for reparations on a massive 
scale. American churches were but the first institutions 
asked by Forman to discharge this great debt. 
The Manifes to achieved immediate notoriety and 
stimulated debate in newspapers and magazines. 
Within a short period, however, public excitement 
died away. 
The issue of reparations has always found favor 
within the African American community itself, taking 
root not long after the freeing of the slaves during the 
Civil War. It flourished around World War I with the 
Marcus Garvey movement and later found voice in 
Forman's Black Manifesto. It has recently regained vital-· 
ity, given new life by a recent precedent, the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988, in which Congress authorized 
payment of reparations to Japanese American citizens 
who had been interned during World War II. In each 
session of Congress since 1989, Representative John 
Conyers has introduced a bill to create a commission to 
study repara tions for slavery and segregation . 
Although the bill has made no legislative headway, the 
publication now of Randall Robinson 's new book 
reflects the growing sense among many African 
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Americans that the time is right to push reparations 
back onto the public agenda. 
If public debate is to prove fruitful, however, both 
proponents and opponents of reparations will have to 
sidestep certain common but toxic confusions. In a long 
article in The Washington Post last December, these con-
fusions were much on display. The article's lead ques-
tions-"Should the U.s. pay reparations to the 
descendants of slaves?" and "[W]hy shouldn't the great 
grandchildren of those who worked for free and were 
deprived of education and were kept in bondage be 
compensated?"-were countered by another - "Why 
should Americans who never owned slaves pay for the 
sins of ancestors they don't even know?" The article 
quoted Congressman Henry Hyde's firm answer to the 
last question: "The notion of collective guilt for what 
people did [200-plus] years ago, that this generation 
should pay a debt for that generation, is an idea whose 
time has gone. I never owned a slave. I never oppressed 
anybody. I don't know that I should have to pay for 
someone who did [own slaves] generations before I was 
born." His response didn't satisfy at least one African 
American, whose letter-to-the-editor noted, "Henry 
Hyde, like many whites, is quick to say, '1 never owned 
a slave' .... Why should 1 pay ... for something my 
ancestors did? . . Well, because some people are 
descendants of slave owners and have profited from the 
labor of blacks who were never paid for their labor." 
Personal versus Civil Liability 
The demand for reparations to African Americans 
cannot be casually dismissed. It is grounded in a basic 
moral norm, a norm presupposed, for example, in the 
Biblical injunction at Exodus 22: "If a man steal an ox, 
or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall restore five 
oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep." You must 
make good the wrongs you do. This principle in one form 
or another underlies every mature moral and legal sys-
tem in the world. At the same time, however, Henry 
Hyde's distaste for collective guilt seems equally well-
founded: "The father shall not be put to death for the 
children, neither shall the children be put to death for 
the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his own 
sin" (Deuteronomy 24:16). We must 110t penalize one per-
son for another's misdeeds. Does, then, the demand for 
reparations pose a conflict between two distinct and 
equa lly basic moral principles? Not if the demand is 
properly understood. 
Henry Hyde echoes a common but confused senti-
ment. If personal liability for slavery or past racial 
oppression were being imputed to him, then the 
Congressman's response would be appropriate. He 
den;es personal responsibility for the wrongs to be 
made good. But personal responsibility and liability 
are not at stake. The real issues are corporate responsi-
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bility-the responsibility of the nation as a whole-
and civic responsibility-the responsibility of each citi-
zen to do his fair part in honoring the nation's 
obligations, When Congress passed the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988, no one assumed that individual 
Americans were being held accountable for personal 
wrongdoing. The interning of Japanese Americans was 
an act of the United States government and its agents. 
At the time, the government acted for putatively good 
reasons. Fo llowing the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, American officia ls were concerned about the 
security of the West Coast from similar attack or sabo-
tage. Whether the government actually acted for hon-
orable motives or not, the point remains that with the 
passage of time thoughtful Americans-and the gov-
ernment itself-have come to view the internment as 
an unjustified response to the war with Japan, and one 
that wronged its victims. The Civil Liberties Act, and 
The duef wrongs done to African Americans 
were not simply the sum of many individual 
oppressions added together but were the 
corporate acts of a nation. 
the token reparations it paid ($20,000 to each interned 
Japanese American or to his or her surviving spouse or 
children), represented an official apology and a small 
step toward making whole the material losses incurred 
by the internees. The reparations were appropriated 
out of general revenues. Consequently, Henry Hyde, 
as taxpayer, contributed a small portion, not because 
he had any personal responsibility for the internment 
but because as a citizen he is required to bear his share 
of the government's necessary expendilul·es. 
One can make a parallel argument for reparations to 
African Americans. Although countless individual 
Americans throughout our history explOited their 
power or standing to oppress African Americans, that 
power and stand ing itself derived from law - first 
from the latitude of the English Crown, then from the 
Constitution of 1787 (which accepted s lavery in the 
states where it was established), and finally from the 
tissue of post-Civil War "Jim Crow" laws, rules, and 
social conventions that enforced de jure and de facto 
racial segregation. The chief wrongs done to African 
Americans, thus, were not simply the sum of many 
individual oppressions added together but were the 
corporate acts of a nation that imposed or tolerated 
regimes of slavery, apartl1eid, peonage, and disenfran-
chisement. Just as it was the nation that owed Japanese 
Americans ｲ･ｰｾｲ｡ｴｩｯｮｳＬ＠ so it is the nation that owes 
reparations to African Americans. And so it is that 
Americans not as individuals but as citizens owe sup-
port for the nation's debt. 
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Copyright-free items from: Pictorial Archive of Printer's Ornaments from the Renaissance to the 20th Century 
(Dover Publications, Inc., 1980) and Humorous Victorian Spot Tl/ustrations (Dover Publications, inc., 1985), 
both works edited by Carol Belal1ger Grafton. 
Confusions about Liability 
The foregoing seems Simple and plain enough. Why 
then do so many opponents of reparations confuse the 
matter? We might content omselves to speculate unflat-
teringly about their motives, were it not for the fact that 
the proponents of reparations often fall into the same 
and worse confusions. A recent spate of articles in law 
reviews demonstrates that the distinctions among cor-
pOl'ate, civic, and personal liability prove elusive. These 
We need to give up the assumption ... that all 
liabili ty is personaL 
articles try to make the case for reparations and answer 
objections to it. To accept the reasonableness of repara-
tions, they contend, we have to abandon the "individu-
alistic" models characteristic of American law and 
think in terms of group rights and group wrongs. "The 
guiding paradigm of traditional remedies law," writes 
Rhonda Magee in the Virginia Law Review, "is the one 
plaintiff, one defendant lawsuit in which the plaintiff 
seeks the position she would have occupied 'but for' 
the wrong committed by the defendant." Within this 
paradigm, the demand by blacks for reparations seems 
unsustainable, since we can no longer identify individ-
ual successors to slave owners or state agents who pro-
mulgated legal oppression of blacks, nor separate out 
the respective harms to the successors of those who 
lived under slavery and Jim Crow. 
However, at least with respect to the matter of liabil-
ity, it is not the "indiv idualism" of American law that 
we need to give up but the assumption, implicitly at 
work here, that alliiabimy is personaL The argument 
for reparations fits comfortably enough wit/lin the tra-
ditional paradigm when we make sure the focus is on 
corporate liability, for the corporate actor in question, 
the United States, is an "individual" under law. 
Indeed, precisely because it is an "indi vidual" that 
doesn' t die, it can acquire and retain debts over many 
generations, though individual Americans come and 
go. That is why Henry Hyde can indeed owe some-
thing as a result of his ancestors' actions. 
Nevertheless, Magee and others insist on the indis-
pensability of "group" conceptions of victims and 
wrongdoers. Tn the words of Mari Matsuda, victims of 
racial oppression "necessarily think of themselves as a 
group, because they are treated and surv ive as a 
group. [Even] [t]he wealthy Black person still comes 
up against the color line." The "group damage engen-
dered by past wrongs ties victim group members 
together, satisfying the horizontal unity sought by the 
legal mind." Similarly, a "horizontal cOlU1ection exists 
as well within the perpetrator group." Members of the 
latter-whites-continue to benefit from past wrongs 
and from the contemporary privilege their skin-color 
confers upon them. Finally, a horizontal relation of 
moral causa lity obtains between the two groups. The 
relationship might be represented in this way: 
B .... f------ W 
where the arrow represents liability, indicating that W 
owes reparations to B, and where the respective enti-
tlements and liabilities distribute within each group to 
its individual members, who are all tied to one another 
by the "victim" J"victimizer" attributes. 
Magee, Matsuda, and other defenders of reparations 
labor to establish that the harms of slavery and dis-
3 
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crimination affect each and every African American 
(even the wealthy black runs up against the color line) 
and the culpability for the harms extends to each and 
every white (every white unjustly benefits from white-
skin privilege). This picture, in fact, does not represent 
some new "group" paradigm at all, but an individual-
ism run rampant, the product of failing to keep distinct 
personal and civic liability. 
The real lines of liability, I contend, run this way: 
B of G 
t 
c 
where it is G (the government) that owes B (the victims) 
and where members of C (citizens) are duty-bound to 
underwrite government debts. The connection of citi-
zens to the creditor "group" B is indirect and vertical, 
not direct and horizontal. Thus Henry Hyde owes 
something not because he is white or a member of the 
perpetrator "group" but because he is a citizen. The 
various "horizontal" connections among citizens are 
irrelevant. Indeed, included in the citizen "group" are 
African Americans themsel ves. They too will con-
tribute in support of the government's reparations. 
111is outcome strikes the writers I am discussing here 
as an anomaly that needs explaining. In fact, it is no 
anomaly at all once we appreciate that blacks are citi-
zens as well as victims and that their equal citizenship 
is reflected in their civic obligation to support govern-
ment reparations-whether those reparations are paid 
to Japanese Americans or even to themselves in their 
capacity as wronged individuals. 
Unfortunately, the ghost of personal responsibility is 
not so easily exorcised from these legal essays. This is 
especially true in the case of Vincene Verdun, writing 
in the Tulane Law Review. Although self-consciously 
rejecting "individualistic" thinking in favor of "group" 
thinking, she nevertheless edges close to the proper 
conclusion when she observes that the "wrongdoer" 
owing reparations is American "society." However, her 
failure fully to grasp the corporate nature of "society" is 
betrayed by her next move. "Treating society as the 
w rongdoer," she observes, "necessarily includes the 
injured parties in the classification of wrongdoer. If 
society pays, it will do so at least in part with tax dol-
lars, and African Americans pay taxes." Nevertheless, 
" [t]here is a ring of propriety in having African 
Americans share in the ... burdens," observes Verdllil. 
Why? Here we expect Verdun to note that Afri can 
Americans are citizens like everyone else. Instead, she 
locates the propriety in their own guilt! 
Opponents of reparations are quick to point out that Africans 
participated in the slave trade and [some] AfTican Americans 
owned slaves. The truth in these statements cannot be 
rebutted. Vincent Verdlm [the author's father, inh'oduced in a 
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prologueI, is an injured party, because he was deprived of his 
rightfu l inheritance because his great-great-great grandmother 
was a slave. On the other hand, his great-great-great grandfa-
ther [the offspring of a French plantation owner and his black 
slave, and who was later emancipated and given landl was a 
slave owner. 
Now, aside from the fact that the situation Verdun 
describes was fairly rare, what possible connection 
could there exist between Vincent Verdun, who lived 
his life as a black man, and his sla ve-owning great-
great-great-grandfather that would visi t on him the 
sins of his ancestor? Indeed, what connection between 
this ancestor and Vincene Verdun herself could lead 
her to confess, as she later does, that h er "heritage," 
In making the case for reparations, it is a 
mistake to go looking for personal complicity 
on the part of those who must pay. 
deriving from both "master and sla ve," makes her not 
only a victim but one of the "wrongdoers," the group 
that owes reparations? No connection exists between 
these two Verduns and their long-ago ancestor except 
one, blood. Evidently, guilt travels through blood, 
since neither Vincene nor her father derived any last-
ing benefit or privilege from the their ancestor-
indeed, their only significant inheritance was the color 
of their skin. 
The racialist assumption embedded in Verdun's 
"confession" speaks for itself. What would prompt a 
level-headed legal scholar to step into such a malodor-
ous swamp? The explanation lies in Verdun's failure, 
despite her ostensible attachment to "group" thinking 
over "individualistic" thinking, fully to appreciate the 
various ontologies of groups and the difference 
between collective and corporate li ability, a failure 
Magee and Matsuda share w ith her. She seems to 
assume that any property that characterizes "society" 
must characterize each of its members. If "society" is a 
"wrongdoer," then each member of society must be a 
wrongdoer. It is easy enough for her to view every 
w hite as a "wrongdoer" but she is forced to stretch to 
include blacks themselves as part of the "wrongdoers" 
since they, too, are part of "society": they are taxpayers. 
When" society" is understood corporately, however, 
the "wrongdoing" of society does not distribute to each 
of its members. Individual citizens may be blameless 
for the wrongs of their nation. That tile burden of pay-
m ent for national wrongdoing falls on them simply 
reflects their civic roles and not anything about their per-
sons. In making the case for reparations, it is a mistake 
to go looking for personal complicity on the part of those 
who must pay: And worse yet, it is a mistake to tum the 
putative personal complicity into guilt-by-blood. 
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Randall Robinson himself is less than careful in this 
regard. Sometimes in his book it is "white society" that 
must pay reparations, sometimes the "whole society." 
At one place, the debtors are characterized as those-
"nations, individuals, whites as a racial entity"-who 
benefited from slavery and segregation. Finally, 
BaSing reparations on slavery and the 
great benefits accrued to whites invites 
complication and controversy. 
Robinson, too, appeals to blood: the value of the labor 
stolen from sla ves, he says, has been compounding 
"through the blood lines" of slave ow ners. Just how 
blood transmits and compounds debt he does not say. 
The imprecision and nea-racialist overtones in Th e 
Debt evidently caused Robinson some second 
thoughts. He recently wrote in The Na tion that "indi-
vidual Americans need not feel defensive or under 
attack" as a result of the call for reparations. "No one 
holds any living person responsible" for slavery or its 
successor regime of Jim Crow. We must all, "as a 
nation," address reparations, he writes. That is the 
right focus. 
Making the Case for Reparations 
Avoiding the confusion about corporate, civic, and 
personal liability clears the way to explore more fruit-
fully the positive case for reparations. How should that 
case go? The argument mounted by Robinson, Verdun, 
Magee, and other African Americans bases reparations 
on the great wrong of slavery as well as the more 
recent wrongs of legally sanctioned discrimination. 
Further, the argument stresses the pmported benefits 
that whites over the centuries have extracted from 
slavery, Jim Crow, and a general social system of white 
supremacy. 
However, basing reparations on slavery and on the 
great benefits accrued to whites invites complication 
and controversy. I suggest the case is actually strength-
ened by dropping both slavery and the benefits reaped 
by whites as grounds for reparations. Let me explain. 
First, although the proposition that whites as a 
whole have benefited enormously from past racial 
oppression might seem self-evident, and remains an 
article of faith among the reparationists, whether slav-
ery and segregation in fact yielded net positive eco-
nomic benefits to this country and to whom those net 
benefits flowed (to all or only some whites) are diffi-
cult questions to answer. More importantly, trying to 
answer them is diversionary and unnecessary. A suffi-
cient basis for reparations lies in the wrong done 
African Americans by the nation, whether or not any-
one really benefited from it. After all, the basis of the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was not some putative bene-
fit Americans had extracted from the internment of 
Japanese Americans in 1942-45. The basis was the 
wrong done to the internees. 
What wrong to African Americans, then, should cuy-
rent reparations address? Making slavery the basis for 
reparations is unwise for two reasons. First, doing so 
invites the retort that America has already paid for the 
wrong of slavery, not with money but with the blood 
shed in the Civil War. The attempt successfully to 
parry this retort leads to complications, since whether 
to reckon the blood sacrifice of the Civil War as expia-
tion for the sins of the past and how to weigh that sac-
rifice against any unpaid debt to the newly liberated 
slaves are questions that invite calculations prone to 
sophistical quibbling on either side. 
A second reason it is unwise to base reparations on 
the fact of slavery is that the passage of time since abo-
lition has now itself become a morally significant fac-
tor. Whatever condition they find themselves in, 
people have the responsibility to make the best of their 
circumstances, to provide for themselves even if they 
start with the most meager resources. For example, 
between 1865 and 1965, millions of immigrants came 
A sufficient basis for reparations 
lies in the wrong done African Americans 
by the na lion. 
to America penniless and with little to offer but their 
physical labor. By dint of hard work, they and their 
successor generations eventually blended into the 
larger American fabric. 
Over time one might have expected a similar process 
to play itself out for the newly liberated slaves, espe-
cially since their numbers would have allowed them to 
possess considerable political power in several states. 
Yet this process didn't occur. Why not? Because, after 
having made the newly freed slaves citizens, the fed-
eral government abandoned them. It allowed southern 
whites, through terror and law, to recapture control of 
state govermnents, disenfranchise African Americans, 
and, through the apparatus of Jim Crow, reduce them 
to virtual peonage. Indeed, America's highest comt 
put its official stamp on state apartheid in its 1896 rul-
ing, Plessy v. Ferguson, a ruling that Justice Harlan, in 
dissent, accurately predicted would one day be viewed 
by Americans as no less pernicious than the Court's 
fateful decision in Dred Scott. 
In sum, governments-state and federal-made no 
effort to vindicate the rights to full and equal citizen-
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ship the Civil War Amendments extended to blacks, a 
failure tha t prevented African America ns fro m suc-
cessfully following the immigrant model. That failure 
persisted into recent times. The U. S. began to expend 
rea l effort toward defending the basic rights of blacks 
only after the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Bmw/1 v. 
Board of Education, an effort far from complete today. 
Had the federal government done nothing after 1865 
except vigorously protect the civil and voting rights of 
blacks, the legacy of slavery would have faded can sid-
6 VOL. 20, NO. 2/3 (SUMMER 2000) 
erably if not wholl y by now through the industry of 
blacks themselves. That the legacy still persists owes 
much, if not ali, to the post-Civil War oppression of 
African Americans and it is this wrong that offers the 
most direct and salient basis for reparations. 
Answering Objection s 
Some may object that the post-Civil War oppression 
of African Americans s till leaves the case for repara-
tions unpersuasive. They might insist that reparations 
are not possible or, alternatively, that they are not nec-
essary. 
Consider the first, that repara tions are not pOSSible 
because we can ' t now rea lly identify who should get 
what. I argued earlier that the individualist legal para-
d igm creates no real difficul ties in dealing with liability 
for reparations. However, doesn' t it generate problems 
about entitlement to reparations? To whom should repa-
rations be paid? Should every individual black person 
receive reparations? Quite obviously, different blacks 
have fared very diffe rently under past segregation. 
Most of those affected worst are long dead . How was 
the legacy of their wrongful depriva tions diffused to 
their descendants down to the present moment? How 
do we trace the damages? 
Most living African Americans have incurred their 
own indignities and damages under discrimination, but 
how do we match reparations to losses? Do we pay the 
same to the child of middle class blacks who immi-
grated to the United States from the West Indies twenty 
years ago that we pay to an elderly retiree who spent 
half his life as a field hand in Mississippi? Mari Matsudi 
says that even the wealthy black person comes up 
against the color line. True enough. But the damage to 
him has not been the same as the damage to others. A 
scheme of reparations like the program for Japanese 
American internees that pays a flat sum to every black, 
whatever his background and economic condition, does 
not seem very attractive. So might the opponent of 
reparations argue. 
This objection would carry more force if justice for-
bade paying repara tions unless we could identify the 
exact victims and the exact degree of their victimization. 
However, while justice requires that we take special 
care to identify the proper "wrongdoers" from whom to 
extract compensation, it is less insistent that we scrupu-
lously avoid compensating "victims" who weren't real 
victims, especially if such avoidance would mean not 
compensating anyone at all. Beca use the effects of a 
hundred years of racial oppression have been dispersed 
so widel y throughout the Afri can American commu-
ni ty, it makes sense to adopt some scheme of repara-
tions that morally approximates rather than actually 
effects the restoration of victims to their "rightful 
places" - the positions they would have occupied but 
.. : . . 
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for the past history of oppression. Congress could fol-
low the p recedent of post-World War II Germany. 
Apart from paying compensation to some identifiable 
individual victims of its war crimes, Germany made 
reparation payments to organizations that represented 
European and world Jewry, including to the State of 
Israel, on the reasonable assumption that these organi-
zations in the comse of their efforts to resettle displaced 
Jews would benefit many of the victims of the Nazi 
regime. Similarly, Congress could fashion a reparations 
p lan to fund specially designated organiza tions who 
would act on behalf of the Africa n American commu-
ni ty. A reparations program need not involve govern-
ment indiscrimjnately writing checks to individ ual 
African Americans. 
Even if the first objection is not telling, what about 
the second? Are repara tions actually necessary? The 
opponent of reparations might argue that the country 
did enough when it passed the civil rights laws of the 
A reparations program need not involve 
government indiscrimmately writing checks to 
individual African Americans. 
1960s.1n the words of Jonathan Yardley, these laws "are 
concrete, purposeful and immensely Significant 
attempts to eliminate the vestiges of sla very, to make 
the country equally free to all its citizens." Moreover, 
their "effect has been incalculable." Actually, it might 
be better to say that their effect is quite calculable. We 
can easily measure, for example, the growth of the 
black middle class since 1960, the near-parity between 
black and white high school graduation rates, and the 
upsmge in black public officials and legislators. We can 
also count the growth of African Americans on campus 
over the last forty years, and calculate the narrowed 
gap in earnings between similarly skilled black and 
white workers. Surely, then, we can extrapolate from 
these improvements to even further progress for 
African Americans in the near future. What would 
reparations add? 
The answer is that reparations would add something 
quite important. Although the gains from the civil 
rights laws of the 1960s are undeniable, they should not 
be overstated . 1n particular, the narrowing income gap 
between whites and blacks masks a tremendous wealth 
gap. As Dalton Conley points out in an important new 
study, "At ail income, occupational, and ed ucation lev-
els, black fa milies on average have drasticall y lower 
levels of wealth than similar white fa milies." Moreovel; 
he argues, it is the wealth rather than income of parents 
that proves pivotal to a child's ascending the academic 
and economic ladders to the middle class and beyond. 
The black-white wealth gap is large, enduring, and 
damaging. Moreover, it is for the most part a direct 
legacy of official and unofficial discrimination lasting 
into the 1960s. Consequently, reparations at this late 
date would not be gratuitous; there is real work for 
them to do. A properly structured reparations program 
enacted by Congress could funnel substantial resources 
over three or four decades into organi zations specifi-
ca ll y designed and monitored to Cl"ea te wealth among 
African Americans- organizations that would assist 
development of neighborhoods, ownership of homes, 
creation of businesses, and expansion of human capi-
tal. These organizations could direct their energies and 
investments toward local and small-scale interventions 
to interrupt the cycle of poverty and hopelessness that 
traps the black underclass and toward broad -based 
efforts to secu re the growing middle class in its eco-
nomic purchase on the American dream. Such invest-
ments in infrastructure and wealth-creation would go 
some distance toward repairing for African Americans 
as a whole the damages occasioned by a hundred years 
of legal oppression. 
Th e Limits of Reparations 
The foregOing represents barely the sketch of a case 
for reparations. But it does suggest the contours of a 
speci fic, "lean" strategy: reparations (i) based on the 
wrongs done African Americans by the legal regime of 
racial discrimination that las ted untjl thirty-some 
years ago, and (ii) designed to stimulate crea tion of 
wea lth, broadly conceived, in the African American 
community. It is "lean" because it omits elements 
many African Americans embrace, particularly the 
argument about slavery and the wealth that was pur-
portedly extracted from it. Thirty years ago, in dis-
cussing a proposal put forward by Yale law professor 
Boris Bittker that the "post-Civil War wrongs are more 
than sufficient to support" a claim for reparations, the 
African American legal scholar Derrick Bell conceded 
that " the lega l argument for repara tions improves 
with the exclusion of the slavery period ." 
Nevertheless, such exclusion, he thought, represents a 
" tactical loss ." It "sacrifices much of the emotional 
component that provides moral leverage for black 
reparations demands." To the contrary, excluding slav-
ery not only improves the legal case for reparations, it 
strengthens both the tactical and the moral cases as 
well by stripping them of diversionary complications. 
It is true, however, that excluding slavery may sacri-
fi ce for African Americans some of the emotional reso-
nance of the reparations argument, and this aspect 
may turn out, in the eyes of some, to be the most vital 
part of all. Although Randall Robinson's The Debt 
seems on its face to be addressed to a larger public, its 
real audience is other African Americans. It is a book 
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less about the details of reparations (they receive little 
more than a nod in the next-to-last chapter) than about 
Robinson's unrequited anger at slavery and the "stag-
gering breadth of America's crime" against blacks. The 
real crime of slavery for Robinson? It has "maliciously 
shorn" African Americans of their "natural identity" 
and destroyed their self-esteem, leaving a people riven 
by self-hatred, self-doubt, and self-rejection. The real 
and continuing injury has been psychic. (Similarly for 
Vincene Verdun: "It is emotional injury, stemming 
from the badge of inferiority and from the stigma 
attached to race which marks every African American, 
that composes the most significant injury of slavery.") 
Thus, for Robinson the emotional resonance of slav-
ery for African Americans is not some unnecessary 
complicating factor to be trimmed away from a clean 
argument for reparations, it is the centerpiece for an 
aggressive, collective demand for redress. By pressur-
ing "white society" to confess its sin of slavery and by 
"implacably demand[ing]" their full due, African 
Americans will "find" their own "voice." Fighting the 
fight for reparations on the basis of slavery will bring 
"catharsis." African Americans will rediscover their 
identity and know themselves to be a worthy people, 
win or lose. 
Robinson's vision starkly poses a crucial question: 
what do African Americans take to be the real stakes 
in a reparations argument? Is the goal to succeed (with 
as many allies as possible) against high odds in achiev-
ing a reparations enactment by Congress that will 
bring some limited but vital wealth-creation to African 
American communities? Or is the goal of reparations 
to force a debate on their terms, as a vehicle of self-dis-
covery and emotional self-renewal, however socially 
divisive it becomes and however remote it makes 
actual enactment of reparations? Readers of The Debt 
will not find a clear rendering of the trade-offs 
between these goals that Robinson is willing to coun-
tenance; but they cannot fail to see his passion for stak-
ing out the "sin" of slavery as the field on which to do 
battle. If this passion is unyielding, however, the 
debate about reparations m ay never really engage 
Americans at large. This would be too bad. A real pub-
lic debate, stripped of disabling confusions while 
sharply focused on manageable grow1ds and practical 
results, could do every citizen a service. 
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